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DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE TO THIRD PERSONS
ON THE PREMISES
In dealing with the problem of the standard of care owed by an
owner or occupier of land to one injured upon that land, the courts
have traditionally engaged in an examination of the legal status of
the entrant in an effort to determine whether he was a trespasser, li-
censee or invitee.1 After the plaintiff has been placed in one of these
categories, certain general rules have been applied which require
varying degrees of care by the occupier with respect to each class.
2
Rowland v. Christian3 involved a suit by a social guest who was
injured in his host's apartment when the knob of a cold water faucet
broke while he was using it. The defendant was aware that the faucet
was defective and had reported that fact to her landlords. Yet, she
failed to warn the plaintiff of the defect, which was not obvious, even
when she knew that he was about to encounter it. The court, with
two judges dissenting, reversed a summary judgment for the de-
fendant entered in a lower court.
Referring to a California statutory provision4 reflecting the gen-
eral principle of tort law imposing liability for want of ordinary
care,5 the court concluded that exceptions to this statutory rule should
not be made "unless clearly supported by public policy."6 In the
court's opinion this criterion was not met by the common law dis-
'See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 58, at 364 (3 d ed. 1964). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
or TorS (1965) defines these terms as follows:
§ 329 Trespasser Defined. "A trespasser is a person who enters or remains
upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by
the possessor's consent or otherwise."
§ 330 Licensee Defined. "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or
remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent."
§ 332 Invitee Defined. "(i) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business
visitor."
2See, e.g., Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 1959); Rogers
v. Cato Oil & Grease Co., 396 P.2d ooo (Okla. 1964).
3- Cal. 2d - 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
'"Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person...." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714 (West 1954).
5"Failure to use reasonable care is the foundation of all negligence, and a
finding of such fact is a ncessary prerequisite to tort liability...." Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Messmore, 339 P.2d 779, 782 (Okla. 1959); accord, Dobbertin v.
Johnson, 95 Ariz. 356, 390 P.2d 849 (1964); Robelen Piano Co. v. DiFonzo, 53 Del.
346, 169 A.2d 240 (1961); Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1958);
Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139 S.E.2d 863 (1965); Barnette v. Dickens, 205 Va.
12, 135 S.E.2d lo9 (1964).
0443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at ioo.
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tinctions between trespassers, licensees and invitees. Feeling that
these distinctions tend to obscure, rather than illuminate, the proper
basis for imposing liability, the court stated: "We decline to follow
and perpetuate such rigid classifications." 7 The new test to be ap-
plied is whether the occupier acted as a reasonable man in view of the
foreseeability of harm to those on the premises.8 Applying this rule
to the facts of the case, it was concluded that the failure to repair
the defective faucet or to warn of its potential danger constituted
negligence.
The common law distinctions of trespasser, licensee and invitee
had their origins in the mid-nineteenth century,9 and a set of rather
well-defined rules soon developed with respect to each class.10 These
rules have subsequently been altered and eroded by the courts. How-
ever, certain general propositions are still nearly universally followed.
For example, the owner or occupier of premises has no duty toward
a trespasser, except to refrain from injuring him by willful or wanton
conduct." This is also true with respect to the duty owed a licensee, 1'2
who has no right to expect that the premises will be prepared for his
7/d. at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
6The court mentioned the existence of liability insurance. Rather than using
it as a basis for imposing liability, however, the court suggested that it should not
be deemed a reason for refusing to require a duty of reasonable care.
[T]here is no persuasive evidence that applying ordinary principles of
negligence law ... will materially reduce the prevalence of insurance due
to increased cost or even substantally increase the cost. Id. at 567-68,
70 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
OSee Marsh, The History and Comperative Law of Invitees, Licensees and
Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182 (1953), in which the author points out how the
various attempts to resolve the conflicting values of the sanctity of landed property
and the need to protect the community from negligence, combined with a judicial
distrust of the jury system, resulted in the development of different categories of
entrants.
'IGt should be noted that an entrant's status may shift while he is on the land
when his relationship to the occupier changes, or when he exceeds the scope of
his invitation. See Mathias v. Denver Union Terminal Ry., 137 Colo. 224, 323
P.2d 624 (1958) (invitee became licensee); Brant v. Matlin, 172 So. 2d 9o2 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965) (licensee became invitee); Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d
103 (965) (invitee became licensee).
"E.g., Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Mathis, 349 F.-d 897 (0oth Cir. 1965);
Langford v. Mercurio, 254 Miss. 788, 183 So. 2d 15o (1966); Beauchamp v. New
York City Housing Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 400, 19o N.E.2d 412, 240 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1963); Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 44o (1965);
Nalepinski v. Durner, 259 Wis. 583, 49 N.W.2d 6oi (1951).
2E.g., Steinmeyer v. McPherson, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P.2d 236 (1951); Maxwell
v. Maxwell, 140 Mont. 59, 367 P.2d 308 (ig6i); Walker v. Williams, 215 Tenn.
195, 384 S.W.2d 447 (1964)-
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reception, even though he has entered with permission.
13 There is
almost universal agreement that a social guest, no matter how ex-
pressly he may have been invited, is not an invitee, but a mere licen-
see 14 who must take the premises as he finds them.' 5 Invitees include
only public invitees and business visitors.'6
An invitee enjoys the greatest protection. The occupier has an
affirmative duty of care to inspect his premises and make them safe
for the reception of invitees.17 He must also warn an invitee of any
concealed dangers,' 8 although he has no duty to warn of open or
obvious dangers which are as well known or discernible to the in-
vitee as to the occupier himself.' 9
The most abrupt and sweeping change in these rules has been
made in England where the distinctions between licensees and in-
vitees have been abolished by statute.
20 A "common duty of care"
21
"3The rule is stated to be that the licensee takes the premises as he finds
them. Warner v. Lieberman, 253 F.2d 99, 1o (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, .357
U.S. 920 (1958); Kapka v. Urbaszewski, 47 Ill. App. 2d 321, 198 N.E.2d 569, 572
(1964); Graham v. Loper Elec. Co., 192 Kan. 558, 389 P.2d 750, 753 (1964); Berger v.
Shapiro, 3o N.J. 89, 152 A.2d 20, 24 (1959)-
",See, e.g., Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951); Kapka v.
Urbaszewski, 47 Ill. App. 2d 321, 198 N.E.2d 569 (1964); Wolfson v. Chelist, 284
S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 140 Mont. 59, 367 P.2d 308 (1961);
Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 152 A.2d 20 (1959); Krause v. Alper, 4 N.Y.2d 518,
151 N.E.2d 895, 176 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1958); Davies v. McDowell Nat'l Bank, 407 Pa.
209, i8o A.2d 21 (1962); Walker v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 195, 384 S.W.2d 447
(1964); Cordula v. Dietrich, 9 Wis. 2d 211, 1o N.W.2d 126 (196o).
"For the time being he thereby becomes a member of the host's family and
as such accepts the entertainment accorded him coupled with the understanding
that he must take the premises as he finds them and accommodate himself to
the conditions of his host." Pagliaro v. Pezza, 92 R.I. nio, 167 A.2d 139, 141
(i96i); See also Ziegler v. Elms, 388 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Mo. 1965); Krause v. Alper,
4 N.Y.2d 518, 151 N.E.2d 895, 176 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (1958).
"6RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965), note i supra.
'-Harry Poretsky & Sons v. Hurwitz, 235 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1956); Garrett v.
National Tea Co., 12 Ill. 2d 567, 147 N.E.2d 367 (1958); Graham v. Loper Elec.
Co., 192 Kan. 558, 389 P.2d 750 (1964); Mackey v. Allen, 396 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1965);
Benjamin v. O'Connell & Lee Mfg. Co., 334 Mass. 646, 138 N.E.2d 126 (1956);
Bonniwell v. Saint Paul Union Stockyards Co., 271 Minn. 233, 135 N.W.2d 499
(1965).
"8Harry Poretsky & Sons v. Hurwitz, 235 F.2d 295 (4 th Cir. 1956); Graham v.
Loper Elec. Co., 192 Kan. 558, 389 P.2d 750 (1964); Benjamin v. O'Connell & Lee
Mfg. Co., 334 Mass. 646, 138 N.E.2d 126 (1956); Straight v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
354 Pa. 391, 47 A.2d 605 (1946).
"Chenoweth v. Flynn, 251 Iowa 11, 99 N.V.2d 310 (1959); Del Sesto v.
Condakes, 341 Mass. 146, 167 N.E.2d 635 (196o); Wilkins v. Allied Stores, 308
S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1958).
"oOccupiers' Liability Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
"This duty is defined as "... a duty to take such care as in all the circum-
stances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe
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is imposed upon the occupier but only with respect to those who come
upon his land by his invitation or with his permission. Thus, tres-
passers are not included under the statute.
22
American jurisdictions, which followed England in the adoption
of the traditional distinctions, have not seen fit to follow the English
practice of abolishing the distinctions by legislative action. Rather,
what has happened is that:
[i]n an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban society,
... modem [American] common-law courts have found it nec-
essary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to
create subclassifications among traditional common-law cate-
gories, and to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care
which the landowner owes to each. 23
This erosion can be seen most clearly in relation to the duties
which have been imposed upon the occupier with respect to licensees.
A distinction has been made between active and passive negligence,
24
and the occupier is now held to a duty of reasonable care as to any
affirmative actions which he may take while a licensee is on the prem-
ises.25 The courts have also seized upon the notion that a concealed
dangerous condition known to the occupier is a "trap,' '26 and liability
will be imposed where the occupier fails to disclose it to his licensee.
2 7
With the exception of the duty to inspect the premises to discover such
in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited or permitted by
the occupier to be there." Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31,
§ 2(2), at 834.
2-See Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MODERN L. Ray. 359 (1958).
2Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 63o (1959).
A[Tlhe term 'passive negligence' denotes negligence which permits
defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other words,
negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of the
land itself. 'Active negligence,' on the other hand, is negligence occurring
in connection with activities conducted on the premises, as, for example,
negligence in the operation of machinery or of moving vehicles....
Potter Title &- Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 80 A.2d 76, 78 (1951).
-Ciaglo v. Ciaglo, 20 Ill. App. 2d 36o, 156 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1959); Potter
Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 8o A.2d 76, 79 (1951); Cordula v. Dietrich,
9 Wis. 2d 211, 1oi N.W.2d 126 (1960). See also W. PROssER, TORTS § 60, at 388-89
(3d ed. 1964). Compare Warner v. Lieberman, 253 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1958) (failure
to repair lounge chair was passive negligence and not actionable).
uWalker v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 195, 384 S.W.2d 447, 451 (1964); Szafranski
v. Radetzky, 31 Wis. 2d 119, 141 N.W.2d 902, 905 (1966).
-Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693, 696 (1951); Kapka v.
Urbaszewski, 47 Ill. App. 2d 321, 198 N.E.2d 569, 572 (1964); Mackey v. Allen,
396 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Ky. 1965); Berger v. Shapiro, go N.J. 89, 152 A.2d 20, 24-25
(1959). See also 2 F. HARPER 8: F. JAMS, TORTS § 27.9, at 1471-72 (1956); W.
PRossER, TORTS § 6o, at 389-90 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 342 (1965).
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concealed dangerous conditions, this is identical to the duty owed
to an invitee 2s and is subject to the same limitations that there is no
obligation to warn of dangerous conditions which are open or could be
observed by a licensee using reasonable care for his own safety.29 One
court has made an additional qualification that the occupier must have
had an opportunity to warn the licensee of the danger before the
injury took place.
3 0
Another method which has been used by the courts to shift the
burden from the entrant to the occupier is the broadening of the
category of invitees so as to bring many who were formerly licensees
under its protections. Traditionally, one was an invitee only if he
passed the "economic benefit" test, that is, if because of his presence
there was a possibility of economic benefit accruing to the occupier.31
However, an "invitation" test has also been applied to determine who
is an invitee. 32 This test based upon an implied representation to
the public that the premises have been prepared for their reception.
33
The result is that entrants have been held to be invitees, under this
latter test, in cases where economic benefit was completely lacking.34
But in spite of the trend toward the broadening of the invitee cate-
gory, courts have not permitted social guests to come within the
"invitation" test, nor have they considered gratuitous services per-
formed by a social guest to be sufficient grounds for a finding that
such guests are invitees under the "economic benefit" theory.3 5
Perhaps the greatest dissatisfaction with the decisions of the courts
21See, e.g., Harry Poretsky & Sons v. Hurwitz, 235 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1956);
Graham v. Loper Elec. Co., 192 Kan. 558, 389 P.2d 750 (1964).
2Hennessey v. Hennessey, 145 Conn. 211, 14o A.2d 473 (1958); Mackey v. Allen,
396 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1965).
°Lomberg v. Renner, 121 Vt. 311, 157 A.2d 222 (1959).
31See, e.g., McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1957); Chambers v. Peacock
Constr. Co., 115 Ga. App. 670, 155 S.E.2d 704 (1967); Ward v. Thompson, 57
Wash. 655, 359 P.2d 143 (1961); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, ToRTs § 27.12, at 1478-79
(1956).
2See, e.g., Guilford v. Yale University, 128 Conn. 499, 23 A.2d 917 (1942);
Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95, 187 A.2d 708 (1963); Tanejan v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J.
267, 1o4 A.2d 689 (1954); Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wash. 655, 359 P.2d 143 (1961).
13See W. PRossER, TORTS § 61, at 398-99 (3d ed. 1964).
"Price v. Central Assembly of God, 144 Colo. 297, 356 P.2d 240 (1960)
(attending meeting); Guilford v. Yale University, 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917
(1942) (college reunion). See also Valunas v. J.J. Newberry Co., 336 Mass. 305, 145
N.E.2d 685 (1957) (child with parent in store).
-Kapka v. Utbaszewski, 47 Il. App. 2d 321, 198 N.E.2d 569 (1964) (delivering
gift); Ciaglo v. Ciaglo, 2o Ill. App. 2d 360, 156 N.E.2d 376 (1959) (relative picking
plums); Pearlstein v. Leeds, 52 N.J. Super. 450, 145 A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1958)
(relative preparing for party).
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has been in the area concerning the duty owed to social guests.36 This
dissatisfaction is precipitated not only by the fact that it is very dif-
ficult to fit social guests comfortably into any one of the three cate-
gories commonly recognized, but also by the seemingly logical in-
consistency in saying that although social guests have been invited, they
are not invitees. One court, pointing to this inconsistency, has decided
that social guests expressly invited to the premises will be treated as
invitees.3 7
Other courts, while unwilling to go that far, have taken varying
approaches in an effort to solve the problems caused by the classi-
fication of social guests as licensees. In one jurisdiction, a special
category has been created for social guests.38 However, the duties
which have been imposed upon the occupier of land with respect
to this new class are in fact identical to those duties generally owed
a licensee in most jurisdictions. 39 In contrast, the Supreme Court of
Washington, in Potts v. Amis,40 while retaining the traditional li-
censee classification, gave greater protection to social guests by holding
that the occupier has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid in-
juring a person on his land with his permission.41 Potts allowed re-
covery for injuries sustained when a guest was struck by a golf club
being demonstrated by his host. In a special concurrence, Justice Hill
made the point which has been the basis of the critics' argument
against the traditional system: "Whether these parties were on a golf
course, in a stranger's vacant lot, or on the defendant's lawn is quite
immaterial so far as their duties toward each other are concerned." 42
The common law rules with respect to owners and occupiers of
land are based on history rather than logic. In an effort to reach results
which are comfortable to modern society, the courts have developed
2See Rosenkrantz, Duty to Licensees in California, 2 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV.
230 (1968); 22 Mo. L. REV. 186 (1957); 12 RurcEs L. REV. 599 (1958); 4 VIsL. L.
REV. 256 (1959); 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 313 (1966).
wAlexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La.
Ct. App. 1957).
mScheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 3o8, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
-The court required ordinary care in the exercise of active operations and a
duty to warn of any conditions known to the host to be dangerous. Scheibel v.
Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453, 463 (ig5i). Compare these with the
duties owed licensees in Ciaglo v. Ciaglo, 20 Ill. App. 2d 360, 156 N.E.2d 376,
379 (1959); Potter Title &, Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 8o A.2d 76, 79 (1951);
Walker v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 195, 384 S.W.2d 447, 451 (1964); Szafranski v.
Radetzky, 31 Wis. 2d 119, 141 N.W.2d 902, 905 (1966).
4062 Wash. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963).
4"Id. at 831.
'2 1d. at 833.
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refinements which are highly complex and often confusing. This fact
has troubled the California courts for some time. As early as 1950 it
was judicially stated: "Such an approach [to determining liability] is
unrealistic, arbitrary, and inelastic. The point where the duties to-
wards members of each of the classes begins or ends ... is almost im-
possible of perception.
43
Finally, in Rowland, the supreme court declared that it declined
"to follow and perpetuate such rigid classifications." 44 There is some
language, however, which suggests that the traditional distinctions
may continue to be relevant: "[A]lthough the plaintiff's status as a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise
to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the
status is not determinative." 45 The court wanted to abolish the dis-
tinctions. However, it also realized that it could not ignore what
underlies the distinctions, the question of how the entrant came upon
the land. Thus, the character of the plaintiff's entry will continue
to have some bearing upon potential liability, although it will be
only one of the factors to be considered. Consequently the results
in the cases decided under the new rule may frequently be the same
as under the old common law classifications.
In an effort to determine how the character of the plaintiff's
entry may be relevant in deciding cases under the new rule, it may
be useful to make an analogy to the rules now generally applied with
respect to infant trespassers. In this area the duty owed has been
analyzed in terms of liability for "ordinary" negligence. 46 The fore-
seeability test 47 is applied and it is suggested that courts consider all
the cirmumstances of the particular case.48 Among these circumstances
are the character of the entry, the place where the entry occurs, the
knowledge which the occupier has, or should have of the foresee-
ability of entrants, and the likelihood of a probable injury.4 9 There
is no judicial statement as to the weight to be given each of these
factors.
OFernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73,
76 (Dist. Ct. App. 195o).
"443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
4r1 d.
'8See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
'7This test is concerned with what a reasonable man would know beforehand,
or what he could reasonably foresee. The term escapes precise definition and the
decision as to what is foreseeable is frequently made by resort to hindsight. See
W. PROSSER, TORTS § 50, at 3o6-o9 (3 d ed. 1964).
"'See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 59, at 375 (3d ed. 1964).
"See Vidas v. British Transp. Comm., [1963] 2 Q.B. 65o, 666-67 (C.A.) (Denning,
L.J.).
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In deciding cases where a plaintiff has been injured while upon
another's land, there are conflicting values which must be weighed.
Courts must balance the desire to allow free and unrestricted use of
land by an owner or occupier with the need to protect an entrant
from injuries caused by the occupier's negligence. In the infant tres-
passer cases, the utility to the occupier of maintaining the condition is
examined in light of the risk involved to foreseeable entrants50 This
would be a possible approach in deciding cases under the new rules
in Rowland. It should be recognized, however, that conditions on the
land in cases where liability is imposed upon the occupier, where a
child trespasser has been injured, are usually of a permanent nature.
As a result, their utility to the occupier would appear to be greater
than with respect to the more temporary conditions or activities
normally involved in cases concerning licensees and invitees.
Under the old rules an occupier might be held liable where an
invitee was injured, and be excused where a trespasser was injured
by the very same condition.51 Thus, whether or not the occupier would
be liable in each instance for identical conduct on his part depended
upon the wholly fortuitous circumstance that the plaintiff entered
with or without permission. These results were particularly disturb-
ing in cases where the accident could have been prevented had the
occupier exercised the slightest care.5
2
Rowland attempts to change that result. It rejects the traditional
rule of law which fitst places the plaintiff in one of three categories
and then determines the degree of care owed, solely on the basis of
such classification. The goal is a new approach directed at restoring
a logical basis for determining liability. The occupier will owe the
same duty of reasonable care to all foreseeable entrants. The class of
foreseeable entrants includes those who were formerly licensees and
invitees, i.e. those who entered with permission, as well as trespassers,
c'E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Edgerton, 231 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1956);
Callahan v. Buttrey, 186 F. Supp. 715 (D. Mont. 196o); aff'd, 3oo F.2d 8o9 (gth Cir.
1962); King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959); Reynolds
v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (1958); Mikkelson v. Risovi, 141 N.V.2d 150
(ND. 1966); Dugan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 387 Pa. 25, 127 A.2d 343 (1956); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) or ToRTs § 3 39 (d) (1965).mSee, e.g., Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 3o N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959); Rogers
v. Cato Oil & Grease Co., 396 P.2d 1ooo (Okla. 1964). Compare Chenoweth v. Flynn,
251 Iowa 11, 99 N.W.2d 31o (1959) with Nalepinski v. Durner, 259 Wis. 583, 49
N.W.2d 6o (1951).
r-Frequently, slight care by the occupier could have prevented the injury
regardless of the status of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Warner v. Lieberman, 253 F.2d
99 (7 th Cir. 1958) (defective leg on chaise lounge); Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89,
152 A.2d 2o (1959) (brick on steps missing for two months).
19691
